Big Data SAVE: Secure Anonymous Vault Environment by Soliman, Omar
 Big Data SAVE: 
Secure Anonymous Vault Environment  
 
Omar H Soliman 
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 
oms@cs.nmt.edu 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There has been great progress in taming the 
volume, velocity and variation of Big Data. Its volume 
creates need for increased storage space and improved 
data handling. Its velocity is concern for the speed and 
efficiency of applied algorithms and processes. Its 
variation requires flexibility to handle assorted data-
types. However, as with many emerging fields, security 
has taken a backseat to benchmarks. This has led to 
retrofitting traditional security techniques ill-suited for 
Big Data protection, or high-performance setups 
exposed to data breach. Proposed is an innovative 
storage system that can provide large-scale, low-
overhead data security, akin to safe-deposit boxes. This 
approach allows for anonymously-shared storage 
space, discrete levels of access, plausible deniability, 
and customizable degrees of overall protection 
(including warrant-proof). A promising factor of this 
new model is the use of a simple encryption algorithm 
(proven faster than industry-standard ciphers), that 
provides inherent attack resiliency and strong 
backward secrecy. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Big Data is characterized as data that exceeds the 
processing capacity of conventional database systems 
[12]. The amount of data being produced and collected 
in the world has reached the order of exabytes; the 
New York Stock Exchange itself generates more than 1 
terabyte of information each session [16]. This 
growing paradigm of computer science is a challenge 
to IT administrators tasked with its handling. They face 
unique situations for managing it, either due to its large 
volume, high velocity, or pronounced variety [12][17]. 
The sheer size of Big Data-sets makes it difficult to 
store and manipulate, since classic data stores were not 
designed with extreme scalability in mind, nor perform 
efficiently at extreme volume. Additionally, many 
algorithms become impractical when dealing with 
tera/petabyte input. The speed at which these datasets 
are generated can be overwhelming, and the variation 
of data types found in Big Data causes many 
inconveniences when utilizing storage systems 
designed with a specific data set/type in mind, or those 
expecting a certain schema when none may exist. 
The combined benefits of Big Data continue to 
provide multiple benefits to consumers [28]. Engineers 
receive data back from deployed product sensors, and 
can improve the design of failing parts or preempt 
future disasters based on that information. Healthcare 
companies can reduce service cost by analyzing patient 
data and engaging in preventative care or focusing on 
areas of greatest need. Big Data gathered by insurance 
and credit card companies is utilized to reduce 
incidence of fraud and costs. Personalized service on e-
commerce sites is the result of Big Data analysis of 
consumer behavior. Climate patterns are based off 
weather models contained in Big Data-sets. The end 
outcome of Big Data is increased knowledge available 
to decision-makers, which in turn benefits society 
through better-informed decisions, resulting in greater 
efficiency, less cost, and accurate personalization of 
products and services [6]. By the end of 2018, 
companies will have spent more than $150 billion on 
Big Data technologies, to reach almost a quarter trillion 
dollars by 2020 [18]. Most of these technologies focus 
on increasing the technical capabilities of conducting 
analysis on (and deriving knowledge from) Big Data 
collections. 
 
1.1. Cybersecurity Concerns 
 
Meanwhile, relatively less thought seems to be 
placed in securing Big Data [35]. In many cases, this 
data is personal consumer data, and often can be used 
to identify the consumer or affect their privacy [21]. In 
regards to companies that do not encrypt data, or do so 
poorly, customers are faced with possible theft or 
disclosure of their private details and behavior, 
resulting in anything from embarrassment to monetary 
loss. An average cyber breach can cost an organization 
$15 million per year, with 42% of external costs being 
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 directly related to the information stolen [15]. Recent 
examples include Equifax’s disclosure of 143 million 
customer records, Anthem’s loss of 79 million patient 
records, and T.J.Maxx’s exposure of 94 million credit 
cards [19]. For companies that attempt to secure Big 
Data, but suffer the consequences of poor performance 
and re-use of old methodology not intended for this 
paradigm, Big Data-oriented security solutions are 
needed, whose cornerstones are fast encryption and 
key management [33]. Such an efficient solution could 
help increase the adoption and performance of Big 
Data security, as well as ensure compliance with 
emerging privacy laws such as the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (while avoiding 
their costly legal penalties for non-compliance). 
Additionally, swift and tailored Big Data security 
solutions may grant access to datasets deemed too 
risky to handle otherwise, allowing further scientific 
analysis and discovery. 
Thus, the problem present in Big Data is a lack of 
relevant security solutions (fast, scalable, and 
customizable) that can afford sensitive data privacy for 
consumers and operational efficiency for companies. 
 
1.2. Cybersecurity Considerations 
  
In cases of multiple entities simultaneously 
utilizing a single storage platform, their data may share 
the same physical or virtual storage space. This gives 
rise to the risk that data may be leaked or intercepted 
by another user or third party [26][34]. Although 
encryption can protect data contents, obfuscating the 
data location/owner relationship can add defense-in-
depth to the system. This can be accomplished by 
distributing data non-contiguously in the store and 
providing a discrete access mechanism for users. 
In addition, storage of data in a third-party 
environment exposes it to elements beyond the 
originator’s control [26][34]. Data can be shared with 
unauthorized parties or even mined by the service 
itself. Furthermore, the vendor may be compelled to 
produce customer data in the case of a warrant or 
subpoena, leading to a loss of privacy [29]. Thus, 
plausible deniability is a requirement for ensuring 
privacy in such an environment, which can be 
accomplished via careful key management and a 
warrant-proof encryption scheme. Here, warrant-proof 
refers to the trait that even if presented with a valid 
warrant, the system is inherently unable to usefully 
comply, and can only, at most, provide a complete 
copy of the entire datastore (in its encrypted form). 
Finally, not every use-case requires the same level 
of access control. There is a tradeoff between certain 
security aspects (e.g. authentication/auditing vs. 
anonymity), which users may prioritize differently.  
This makes customizability of a secure storage scheme 
an important trait for encouraging its adoption among a 
broader userbase.  
 
1.3. Remaining Sections 
  
In this paper, we describe our implementation of a 
novel and secure Big Data storage-architecture. Section 
2 reviews relevant work in securing Big Data. Section 
3 describes our solution approach. Section 4 details our 
solution architecture. Section 5 provides core 
implementation. Section 6 discusses applications. 
Section 7 concludes with final remarks. 
 
2. Related Work  
 
Reference [20] introduces the use of survivable 
routing and Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks 
(RAID) for providing integrity and confidential Big 
Data storage in network file systems (when combined 
with broader schemes such as Hadoop). The authors 
argue that the common security tactics of preventative 
measures, attack detection, and then recovery are 
inadequate to secure such large cyber assets. Instead, 
they focused on being intrinsically attack tolerant by 
eliminating single points of failure, through the use of 
fragmentation and eventual reassembly of stored data. 
They also argue that incorporating intrusion tolerance 
within a Big Data security architecture is preferable to 
attempting complete prevention. Compelling points of 
the paper are the need to inherently expect and tolerate 
attacks against a Big Data storage system. Also of note 
is the idea of data dispersal (wherein their data is not 
stored contiguously in the system, thereby increasing 
the difficulty of its malicious retrieval), as well as 
reducing the consequence of a single failure against the 
system. 
Reference [9] presents a distributed anonymous 
storage service (“Free Haven”), which focuses on data 
availability for a guaranteed period of time (versus 
absolute persistence). It is based on a trust network 
which involves file sharing. A community of servers 
(nodes) compromises a “servnet”. Each node holds 
portions of documents; these fragments are called 
“shares”. Each node is assigned a “pseudonym”, which 
enables the tracking of server reputation. Reputation is 
used as incentive for nodes to store shares during a 
contractual length of time; fulfilling storage contracts 
raises a node’s reputation, and allows it to store more 
of its own data on other nodes. Shares can also be 
traded, which allows nodes to fluidly move in and out 
of the servnet. Additionally, shares have a hard 
expiration date, and can be dropped at the end of their 
holding contracts. The greatest feature of this service in 
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 a Big Data context is the provision of multiple kinds of 
anonymity (that of the authors, publishers, readers, 
servers, documents, and queries). Drawbacks include 
the use of relatively slow public/private encryption, 
reliance on anonymous networking and volunteer 
computing, and large overhead per transaction. In 
regards to the Big Data paradigm, data velocity is of 
concern in such a system, which relies on broadcast 
networking to store and retrieve data. 
Reference [8] describes “Freenet”, implemented as 
a peer-to-peer network that pools drive space 
anonymously, acting as a location-independent 
distributed file system. Nodes query each other to 
publish and retrieve data files (referred to by 
keys/hashes). Each node maintains a portion of local 
data storage for the network, as well as a dynamic 
routing table of other nodes and which files they likely 
hold. Users of the system are encouraged to run nodes, 
both to decrease odds against unintentionally accessing 
a hostile node, and to increase the overall storage 
capacity available to the network. Freenet grants 
anonymity to both producers and consumers of 
information, plausible deniability for holders of 
information, and is resistant to denial-of-service 
attacks. However, it assumes a guaranteed secure 
transport layer, and does not guarantee data 
permanence (a major issue when the goal is to securely 
store data for long periods of time). Additionally, it 
incurs copious overhead during hashing, public/private 
encryption, and decentralized routing. 
Reference [3] deliberates the importance of Big 
Data, specifically in regards to reconciling security 
with privacy. Aside from traditional privacy techniques 
that are not all suitable for Big Data, the authors 
discuss progress in privacy-preserving data analytics, 
such as data matching, mining, and biometric 
authentication. A big issue with these techniques is 
their lack of scaling at the Big Data level, inefficiency, 
or immaturity. Specifically, the common theme of 
these techniques is the secure sharing of Big Data-sets, 
without compromising information to malicious actors, 
while also limiting specific details between 
collaborators. In order to gauge the suitability of 
solutions to varying Big Data scenarios, they propose a 
multi-objective optimization framework for data 
privacy (using cost/utility/risk). However, it is limited 
by the need to objectively deduce acceptable levels for 
those parameters. Lastly, they detail issues surrounding 
Big Data confidentiality (in terms of access control and 
encryption) as well as possible privacy-violating 
correlation between datasets. 
Reference [36] discusses Big Data security in light 
of cloud computing. The authors present a 
computational cloud model in order to evaluate Big 
Data use cases. They survey three specific security 
techniques (homomorphic encryption, verifiable 
computation, and multi-party computation), in specific 
cloud-trust contexts (un/semi/trusted), using their 
model to evaluate confidentiality and integrity of 
simulated data. Because of Big Data’s inherent 
business-related nature and value, a recurring theme in 
this Big Data paper and many others focuses on 
maintaining confidentiality throughout computation, 
through the use of homomorphic and/or functional 
encryption schemes [7][32][25]. The above approaches 
emphasize manipulating data-at-rest in their encrypted 
state, without focusing on the performance penalty of 
achieving said encryption. Faster encryption designs 
could negate some of the need for homomorphic 
operations (since the cost to decrypt/operate/re-encrypt 
would be relatively negligible). 
Many companies also offer closed-source Big Data 
security products for a fee. CertainSafe offers a Digital 
Safety Deposit Box [27]. A two-part key is used to 
encrypt consumer data (one held by the consumer, the 
other by the company). “MicroEncryption” takes form 
in fragmenting stored data across multiple drives and 
servers, in order to minimize the effects of a single-
server compromise. However, neither the encryption 
algorithms nor their throughput was mentioned. Also, 
the server is not truly keyless since not only does it 
possess a key, it handles the consumer’s key after 
authenticating and identifying them. Dropbox stores 
data using 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) and Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer 
Security (SSL/TLS) tunnels for transfer (no keys are 
held by the user) [11]. Box stores data using 256-bit 
AES and TLS tunnels for transfer [5]. Additionally, 
they use an “encryption key wrapping strategy” that 
also utilizes 256-bit AES. No keys are held by the user. 
Box KeySafe encrypts data with a BoxKey [4]. The 
BoxKey is then encrypted using the user-defined key. 
However, a permanent audit log is kept to record key 
usage, and no explanation of how the BoxKey is 
generated was given, nor any guarantee it cannot be 
recreated. SpiderOakONE claims zero knowledge of 
stored data [31]. Data is encrypted before reaching 
their servers, where it is stored in generalized blocks. 
However, data is encrypted using layered 2048-bit 
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and 256-bit AES 
keys. Those keys are encrypted using a 256-bit AES 
key generated through salted Password-Based Key 
Derivation Function (PBKDF)/Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA)-256. The overhead from those operations is not 
conducive at the Big Data scale. All these closed-
source solutions fail to simultaneously provide broad 
anonymity, low-overhead, high-performance, tamper 
detection, shared storage, zero-server-knowledge, and 
customized access control. 
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 3. Approach  
 
Many large technology companies currently offer 
cloud services, including data storage solutions. The 
biggest of these service providers include Google, 
Microsoft, and Amazon [10].  Reference [14] details 
how security is designed into Google’s technical 
infrastructure. Reference [1] discusses Amazon’s 
approach to security in their web services. Reference 
[22] provides a comprehensive look at the security 
features of Microsoft’s cloud system. Common 
security features implemented in these aforementioned 
services include access control, encryption, and 
logging. 
To provide access control and encryption in a high-
performance security solution, an appropriate 
encryption method needs to be selected. Synchronous 
Dynamic Encryption System (SDES) [30] is a 
lightweight encryption protocol which utilizes 
symmetric keying and provides a streaming block 
cipher mechanism. Its main advantages over a standard 
such as AES are its very high speed (approximately 4 
times faster software benchmark vs. hardware-
accelerated AES) and the involvement of the plaintext 
in the one-way rekeying process. This allows for fault 
tolerance from a mid-stream record compromise – 
previous records do not become any easier to decrypt 
as a result (i.e. backward secrecy). Additionally, this 
provides an inherent integrity mechanism, since key 
generation will falter if any records are improperly 
altered. 
SDES’s low memory footprint and overhead is 
attributable to its simple scheme. A vector of {0-255} 
is shuffled using an initial management key. The 
shuffled vector is now the current encryption key. The 
plaintext record is applied bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) 
with the encryption key to generate ciphertext. The 
plaintext record, management key, and encryption key 
are then combined to form the new management key. 
The new management key is used to shuffle the old 
encryption key. The shuffled, old encryption key is 
now the next encryption key. In total, each byte per 
round of encryption utilizes 2 additions, 3 assignments, 
and 1 XOR operation. The runtime of SDES is O(m*n) 
(the number of records and record size in bytes). The 
cryptanalysis complexity for guessing the key is Ω(2n) 
(regarding the bit-length of the key). These attributes 
give SDES fast execution, and therefore better scaling 
with larger datasets. 
Augmenting the use of encryption is anonymity. 
When utilizing shared data space with others, 
anonymity affords multiple protections. Three types of 
anonymity are of concern. User anonymity refers to the 
concealment of user identities from others (including 
the server). This allows organizations utilizing co-
located systems a lower profile and more protection 
from targeted attacks. Data anonymity refers to the 
concealment of data from everyone but the originating 
user. This allows for plausible deniability in regards to 
hosting specific content, as well as prevention of 
content identification. Crowd anonymity refers to the 
veiling of data amongst other data such that the 
locations of related data are known only to the 
originating user. This is especially useful in Big Data 
since there is a large quantity of data intrinsically 
present in the environment, which can inherently aid in 
crowd anonymity. 
Combining these two components, a parallel can be 
drawn between safe deposit boxes and encryption with 
anonymity. Banks provide a secure location for the 
storage of valuables in an anonymous manner. 
Generally, a client can rent a safe deposit box with the 
bank, bring in some assets, safely store them inside an 
anonymous box, receive a key and box number, and 
can then retrieve the valuables at a later time. The 
bank’s vault contains many of these boxes that serve 
many customers, with no indication of their contents 
nor owners. The bank (in theory) cannot access the 
secured contents alone, without the help of the owner. 
In some cases, the bank can provide monitoring service 
of box openings, or provide privacy when they are 
being accessed. 
This approach to securing Big Data is to emulate 
the workings of a bank’s safe deposit box system for 
use as an electronic data store. In classic storage 
models, data and keys belong to the server, which 
decrypts and streams data to the user after successful 
authentication. However, this requires data 
segregation, user-to-data mapping, and trust in the 
server. Implementing user anonymity (limit 
authentication), data anonymity (prevent server from 
reading data in a compromise by not storing keys), and 
crowd anonymity (no mapping of user to data) 
equalizes external and internal threats to the system. 
By utilizing SDES, fallout from a successful 
compromise is limited to a fraction of what it otherwise 
would be. Hence, the Secure Anonymous Vault 
Environment (SAVE) is proposed. 
An implementation of SAVE is hosted on a storage 
system which stows client data by splitting it into 
chunks, encrypting each in series using SDES, and 
fragmenting them throughout a series of safe boxes 
(records). These are simply indexed locations in the 
storage space, which the system cannot reassemble 
without the initial key and location, known only to the 
originating user. Data is reconstructed by unlocking the 
first record and using its contents to locate the next, 
and so on. In effect, users can securely store data 
anonymously in an attack tolerant manner. 
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 4. SAVE Architecture  
 
Reference [2] is a security framework for well-
architected design according to Amazon’s Web 
Services best practices. The two most applicable pillars 
from that framework in the context of SAVE are 
security and performance efficiency. Design principles 
listed for strengthening security include: strong 
identities, traceability, defense-in-depth, automation, 
protecting data in-transit/rest, segregating people from 
data, and anticipating security events. 
In order to implement these principles, SAVE 
consists of a few basic components: the user, initial 
key, incoming authentication, audit logs, front-end 
server, and storage system (Fig. 1). In context of the 
prior design principles: data protection and strong 
identities are enforced through encryption; traceability 
is provided through logging; defense-in-depth is 
present through multi-level security options; and 
automation, data/person segregation, and security event 
anticipation are afforded by the system design itself. 
The nature of SAVE leads to many scheme 
variations and a high level of customizability for 
meeting situational requirements. Detailed variations 
and components of prospective SAVE setups are 
discussed and summarized in Table 1. 
 
4.1. Authentication 
 
Authentication is performed when clients initially 
contact the SAVE host. Its purpose is to potentially 
identify incoming connections and reduce malicious 
traffic. Three authentication levels are presented. Free 
Authentication: no authentication is performed on 
incoming connections to the SAVE host. Clients are 
free to send and receive read-transactions. This allows 
for fast, unsecured communication, but does nothing to 
prevent malicious requests. In this case, user 
anonymity is fully maintained as clients are not 
identified to any server. However, brute force attacks 
may be carried out against encrypted records since 
attackers may freely access the same record repeatedly. 
This could also lead to high incoming traffic from such 
requests. Host Authentication: incoming connections 
Figure 1. Diagram of SAVE architecture 
must first authenticate with the SAVE host, which then 
establishes a long-term session with the client through 
some mechanisms (e.g. cookies). This method is the 
least anonymous since the server must be aware of the 
client’s identity. Although it provides a standard level 
of security, performance will be impacted from the 
overhead. Token Authentication: incoming connections 
must first authenticate with a token server, which 
issues the client a token upon success. It also makes 
available to the SAVE host the token information 
through a secure channel. When establishing 
communication, the client can then use the token as a 
shared secret with the host (e.g. to utilize SDES as a 
lightweight protocol). However, user anonymity is 
reduced, since a token server is aware of their identity 
(although not the SAVE host). Communication speed 
is also impacted depending on protocol choice. 
In addition to authentication, the system must also 
decide how to deal with access control violations. 
Possible actions corresponding to the given 
authentication methods are mentioned below. Free 
Response: clients which repeatedly request the same 
record with different keys (indicative of brute force) 
are blocked. Depending on the service scheme, clients 
which access numerous or certain records may also be 
blocked. Host Response: clients which repeatedly fail 
authentication are blocked. Depending on the other 
components, they may also be warned of suspicious 
actions rather than immediately be blocked. Token 
Response: clients which repeatedly fail authentication 
are blocked. Clients which spoof tokens are also 
blocked. Depending on the other components, they 
may additionally be warned of suspicious actions 
rather than be immediately blocked.  
 
4.2. Logging 
 
Logging is performed whenever the client 
communicates with the SAVE system. Its purpose is to 
provide notation of record accesses. No Logging: no 
client details are logged by any hosts. This provides 
high user anonymity, but at the cost of no auditing 
capability. Basic Logging: request timestamp and 
desired record index are logged. User anonymity is still 
maintained, but record accesses can be referenced later. 
Full Logging: request timestamp, IP address, and 
desired record index are logged. User anonymity is 
severely reduced, but record accesses can be 
referenced in greater detail later. Blockchains could 
also be used to maintain a ledger of record accesses. 
In addition to logging, the system can also include 
active auditing processes that can check for suspicious 
behaviors. Possibilities are listed below. No Auditing: 
audits are not performed on any logged data. This is 
useful in instances where logs are not kept. Temporal 
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 Auditing: audits compare record indices with 
timestamps in attempt to detect irregular timed 
accesses. This is suitable for use with basic logging. 
Full Auditing: audits compare IP address and 
timestamp vs. record index in order to better detect 
irregular record access. This is suitable for use with 
full logging. Moreover, artificial intelligence (e.g. 
Markov chains) can be used to aid in the detection of 
irregular behavior. 
If an audit discovers suspicious activity, the 
following are potential action items. Basic Detection: 
the incident is logged and administrator notified. Since 
a goal of SAVE is anonymity, it may not be possible to 
notify the record owner. IP Reaction: if IP addresses 
are being logged, then the offending client can be 
blocked via firewall. Record Panic: an extreme 
reaction by the SAVE system could be to wipe records 
being accessed maliciously. However, this may not be 
very effective if the data had already been accessed 
(unless it was to prevent multi-client brute force 
attacks in progress). If the SAVE host can derive 
related records to the ones being attacked, some of 
those can be wiped to limit a successful compromise in 
its tracks (although this would reduce crowd 
anonymity in the system). 
 
4.3. Client Request 
  
When clients request records from the SAVE host, 
they must supply certain data for a successful response. 
Varying request structures are described. Key & Initial 
Record Index: clients supply an alleged management 
key for decrypting the requested record and expect the 
SAVE host to decrypt the related records in series. If 
the request is legitimate, the SAVE host can do so 
without problem. However, if it is a malicious request, 
then locating related records from the incorrectly 
decrypted content and choosing what to return depend 
on other system settings. This method is also relatively 
inefficient if a specific record is ultimately desired 
from the middle of larger dataset (since all prior related 
records must first be decrypted). Key & Record Index: 
clients supply an alleged management key for 
decrypting the requested record. This differs from the 
previous scheme in that a record from the middle of a 
dataset can be accessed directly (although the client 
must store additional keys for every such access point). 
Key & Record Index & Total: clients supply an alleged 
management key for decrypting the requested record, 
Figure 2. Example of record contents 
along with the total number of records they wish to 
retrieve from the dataset. This allows the SAVE server 
to better deal with malicious requests (since it can 
return an appropriate amount of spoofed data matching 
the requested record count) and potentially improve its 
resource allocation when prioritizing responses (many 
small taskings vs. one sizeable request). 
 
4.4. Server Response 
  
When a client presents the SAVE host a request, an 
appropriate response will be returned depending on the 
chosen system scheme. Full Response: when using the 
client request scheme with total records requested, the 
SAVE host responds by accessing and decrypting the 
initial record, then attempts to decrypt the given 
number of records from the series. If the decryption 
fails due to malicious request, the server returns an 
appropriate amount of noise to mimic a successful 
access (in an attempt to not aid the attacker). Coded 
Response: the SAVE host responds by accessing and 
decrypting the first record and any that are linked if the 
given key is correct. Otherwise, it stops when a 
decryption fails or an inaccurate total of records is 
requested (dependent on record content structure). 
Single Response: the SAVE server responds with only 
a single record access and attempted decryption. This 
is useful for high volumes of granular accesses (since it 
is quickly locating and decrypting a specific record) or 
parallel request responsiveness (multiple-users would 
each get a small amount of data in succession, rather 
than waiting to reach the front of a queue). 
 
4.5. Record Structure 
  
There are many possible schemes (Fig. 2) for 
record contents (which can support other system 
components). Un-hashed Content: records contain data 
and the index of the next record in the dataset (in 
encrypted form). After decryption, the SAVE host 
attempts to update the current key and access the next 
record. This maintains crowd anonymity (since the 
location of related records is not known until 
decryption), but the host has no reliable way of 
determining if an attempted decryption was successful 
or not. Hashed Content: records contain data and the 
index of the next record in the dataset along with a 
hash (in encrypted form). After decryption, the SAVE 
server attempts to generate the sequential encryption 
key and access the next record after ensuring the hash 
is valid. This maintains crowd anonymity (since the 
location of related records is not known until 
decryption), but the server has a method of determining 
if an attempted decryption was successful or not. 
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 Empty: if the SAVE server maintains a list of record 
indices currently in use, then the ones not in use are 
essentially empty. This reduces crowd anonymity since 
the server is effectively aware of which records are 
currently occupied. This is, however, useful when 
assigning new data to record locations, and detecting 
malicious requests (since empty records should 
naturally go unrequested). Traps: the SAVE server can 
strategically place decoy records within the vault in 
order to better detect malicious requests or act as 
honeypots for attackers. They can range from plaintext 
that is returned as if successfully decrypted or used to 
immediately trigger an audit response. 
 
4.6. Record Allocation 
  
There are many possibilities for sizing the SAVE 
storage space. Single Uniform Records: the storage 
space is uniformly divided into records of equal size 
and indexed sequentially. This maintains crowd 
anonymity since the records are all identical, and 
makes addressing them relatively simple. Multi 
Uniform Records: the storage space is uniformly 
divided into records of equal size which are grouped 
into uniform size boxes. This somewhat reduces crowd 
anonymity, but also reduces the overhead of successive 
record lookups (depending on the scaling of the box 
sizes). Dynamic Sizing: rather than pre-allocating the 
storage space, the host provides on-demand, custom-
size storage for datasets. This is detrimental to crowd 
anonymity since records are of varying features (size) 
and therefore differentiable (to an insider). A scheme 
would also need to be implemented in order to address 
the data structures. 
 
4.7. Submission 
 
Storing data in the SAVE system is dependent on 
many of the factors discussed above. Generally, this is 
a stricter operation than reading since the SAVE host 
may be subject to denial of service by resource-
consuming writes. The SAVE host must also be able to 
track record usage (either by an occupied list or 
dynamic storage) in order to safely locate unused 
records for depositing data into storage. Free 
Submission: in high-trust situations, clients may submit 
a key and dataset to be encrypted and stored in the 
vault, and are returned an initial record number by the 
SAVE host. If the user wishes to edit already stored 
data, a record number must also be provided (which 
may require decryption and re-encryption using the 
newly supplied data for all downstream records). This 
presents a high risk of malicious writes; however, it 
maintains high user anonymity. Additionally, an 
insecure line leaves the data and key vulnerable to 
interception (public keying may be useful). Registered 
Submission: storing data requires first authenticating in 
some manner with the system (in order to alleviate 
malicious writes, and in the case of paid systems, to be 
charged). Afterwards, encrypted datasets may be 
deposited into the vault for safekeeping, with initial 
record numbers returned to the clients for future 
retrieval. This reduces user anonymity since 
submissions must come from registered sources. 
 
5. Core Implementation  
 
To initially implement SAVE, its core encryption 
functionality was encoded in the C programming 
language as a Linux kernel module, so that it could be 
utilized via the Linux CryptoAPI [24]. Electronic Code 
Book (ECB) keying was used to wrap SDES as a block 
cipher. Ideally, stand-alone SDES keying would wrap 
an XOR cipher; however, using ECB allows for more 
direct comparison vs. AES performance at this early 
level. Basic Application Programming Interface (API) 
calls include decrypting/encrypting a block, and setting 
the cipher key. The API also comes with built-in AES 
functionality, useful for benchmarking purposes. 
In order to access CryptoAPI calls from user-space, 
the libkcapi library was employed [23]. This was used 
to run benchmark simulations to compare CryptoAPI 
performance of SDES vs. AES. SDES operates on 256-
byte blocks (otherwise a modulus operation must also 
be used to prevent out-of-bounds addressing). AES 
operated on 16-byte blocks. The algorithms were fed 
multi-gigabyte plaintext, with their performance 
compared to each other, as well identical file 
operations without added security functionality (as an 
overhead baseline). Specifically, 1-10 gigabyte data 
files were encrypted and decrypted using each cipher 
suite, along with plain access of the data (by record),
Table 1. SDES feature summary
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 without any other features active. This provided a 
relative comparison of the SAVE engine runtime 
versus runtime performance of AES encryption 
(traditionally employed in commercial products).  
Results of this basic benchmark indicate that 
SDES exhibited a range of 8-15% overhead penalty 
vs. baseline data access and handling. Matching AES 
operations incurred a 100-190% overhead penalty. 
The actual overhead for each scheme varied steadily 
with each other, and established SDES as 
consistently 12 times faster (on average) than AES, 
which is often used as the industry standard for 
encryption, and commonly found in commercial Big 
Data security solutions on the market. These initial 
results demonstrate the feasibility of SAVE achieving 
multifold performance improvement over existing 
security offerings. Further simulation-benchmark 
results follow. 
 
5.1. Authentication 
 
Overhead from authentication is incurred by 
having to prove identity to the host and/or other 
server. This involves the issuance of a token/cookie, 
and the verification of it with each request. Free 
authentication incurs no penalty, since nothing is 
performed. Host authentication requires identity 
proof via cookie encryption/decryption. Token 
authentication is similar to host authentication, but is 
done via a dedicated server in order to maximize 
anonymity to the storage system. To simulate usage, 
a 256-byte cookie is both encrypted/decrypted each 
time a record is also both encrypted/decrypted from a 
gigabyte dataset. The average of these runs is 
presented below. 
 
Authentication Type Average Overhead 
Host/Token 30% 
AES with None 150% 
Table 2. Authentication benchmark 
 
AES without any authentication functionality was 
5 times slower than SAVE running with 
authentication enabled. 
 
5.2. Logging 
  
Logging overhead occurs from storing log data, as 
well as auditing logs for malicious behavior. 
Simulation was performed by encrypting/decrypting 
a gigabyte of records and appending log data to a file. 
Simple auditing additionally involved scanning the 
logfile to search for a known-malicious indicator of 
attack. 
 
Logging Type Average Overhead 
Full 15% 
Simple Auditing 16% 
Table 3. Logging benchmark 
 
Full logging did not significantly differ from 
baseline overhead. Naïve auditing did add a minor 
penalty, although advanced auditing (e.g. machine 
learning) would increase overhead more so. 
 
5.3. Verification 
  
It is possible for SAVE to simply return record 
contents, or to first verify decryption success using a 
hash stored in the encrypted record. To measure 
performance penalty, a gigabyte of records was 
encrypted/decrypted first without verification, then 
again followed by content verification. Verification 
overhead itself is heavily tied to the choice of 
algorithm used. For demonstration purposes, 
Fletcher’s Checksum was utilized [13]. 
 
Record Content Average Overhead 
Unverified 15% 
Verified 17% 
AES with None 190% 
Table 4. Record verification benchmark 
 
Even with check-summation, SAVE was 11 times 
faster than AES with no verification at all. 
 
5.4. Multi-Feature 
  
With authentication, logging, auditing, and 
verification enabled, the relative overhead of a simple 
SAVE configuration was simulated across a gigabyte 
of records. 
 
Features Average Overhead 
Multiple 31% 
AES with None 150% 
Table 5. Multi-feature benchmark 
 
When compared to just AES computation, a basic 
SAVE configuration offering much more 
functionality clocked-in at 5 times faster. 
 
6. Applications  
 
There are a wide variety of applications where 
SAVE can provide benefit with its use. Several 
examples are noted. High throughput sharing of 
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 sensitive data is possible using SAVE as a secure 
storage escrow, especially if implemented via in-
memory database or through a similar paradigm. 
Public data stores can be set up and secured using 
SAVE as an anonymous information repository, 
where multiple clients can store and retrieve keyed 
records. Organizations can setup a SAVE system 
within their network to protect against insider threats, 
reduce data leakage, and maintain a competitive 
edge. SAVE can potentially be adapted for use atop 
high performance-focused Big Data stores (e.g. 
Hadoop) as a security layer, to facilitate the 
processing of sensitive data. Finally, SAVE can be 
used to statically store Big Data until data analysis or 
mining operations are performed. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Although much effort has been put into 
improving the performance of Big Data tools and 
benchmarks, relatively less has been placed in 
securing Big Data. This is exacerbated by many 
organizations lacking the funds necessary to host Big 
Data systems themselves and instead turning to third 
party services. This can potentially result in sensitive 
data leaking as the result of a breach, and thus 
discourages the handling of such data (and waste of 
its potential benefit). By utilizing SAVE, service 
providers can offer anonymous and secure storage of 
Big Data, even when shared among multiple clients. 
The high level of SAVE’s customizability should be 
useful for tailoring it to the unique requirements of 
various applications and data demands. Overall, 
SAVE attempts to address high velocity, volume, and 
variety attributes by providing a high-throughput 
storage scheme that can be combined with other Big 
Data tools to provide security with minimized 
overhead. 
Future work includes increased integration within 
the Linux CryptoAPI, full implementation as a Linux 
filesystem, construction of a stand-alone deployment, 
and creation of Hadoop and MongoDB plugins. 
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